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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Stefan James Pfeiffer appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine
claiming the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Pfeiffer also
claims error in the denial of his Rule 35 motion.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Officer Jake Durbin received a call from dispatch about an individual who
was making "irrational statements, talking about having a gun and ... possibly
needing to shoot somebody, and that he was in fear of (sic] his life." (Tr., p.14,
L.25 - p.15, L.6.) Officer Durbin made contact with the individual outside of the
Vista Inn and identified him as Thomas Massey. (Tr., p.14, Ls.11-17; p.15, Ls.712.)

Massey was "[v]ery disheveled," speaking irrationally and behaving

erratically. (Tr., p.15, L.21 - p.16, L.2.) Massey said ''people had put a hit out on
his life" because he had sex with a "white woman," and he was "very nervous."
(Tr., p.16, Ls.2-3; p.38, Ls.9-12.) Massey claimed that "if anybody came close to
him that he thought was trying to kill them, he was gonna shoot them or run them
over with his car." (Tr., p.18, Ls.16-18.) Massey also referred to an individual he
called "Slim" and indicated that Slim was in the hotel room and he "thougl1t that
Slim may be trying to kill him as well." (Tr., p.18, Ls.3-22; p.38, Ls.12-14; p.62,
Ls.6-15.)

Based on Massey's statements, Officer Durbin became concerned

about Slim and advised Corporal Russell Winter, one of the other officers on
scene, that the hotel room should be checked to "make sure that whoever's in
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there is not dead." (Tr., p.18, L.23 - p.19, L.1; p.22, Ls.2-9.)

Officer Durbin

testified that he "felt obligated" to check on Slim because if he was, in fact,
"injured or hurt," it was going to "fall back on [law enforcement] that [they] didn't
do anything." (Tr., p.32, Ls.13-18.)
Corporal Winter agreed that the officers' community caretaking function
required them to make sure nobody was injured inside the hotel room. (Tr., p.39,
Ls.7-9.) Corporal Winter therefore went to the room registered to Massey and
"pounded on the door." (Tr., p.40, Ls.6-14.)

Corporal Winter "pounded long

enough and hard enough that [he] had four or five separate rooms -- people in
rooms on the same floor open their doors to find out what was going on," but
nobody answered the door to Massey's room. (Tr., p.40, Ls.15-18.) As soon as
back-up arrived, Corporal Winter pounded on the door again, and again there
was no answer.

(Tr., p.41, Ls.11-15.)

Corporal Winter gained entry into the

room using a key provided by the motel manager. (Tr., p.41, Ls.15-17.)
Inside the motel room, Officer Durbin saw a man "laying on his right side,
facing away from" the officers. (Tr., p.42, Ls.17-18; p.65, Ls.23-25.) The man
did not respond to the officers' commands. (Tr., p.42, Ls.20-21.) Another officer
"cleared the bathroom for officer safety" and, after "four or five calls," the man on
the bed "finally started to move and ... wake up." (Tr., p.42, L.23 - p.43, L.1.)
At that point, the officers could not tell whether the man was injured because they
could not see his face, chest, or hands. (Tr., p.43, L.21 - p.44, L.1.) Once the
man became aroused enough to speak with the officers, they identified him as
Pfeiffer. (Tr., p.44, Ls.2-11.)
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While the officers were in the motel room trying to arouse Pfeiffer, they
saw "a clear, plastic baggie with a white, powdery substance" on the bed at the
small of Pfeiffer's back. (Tr., p.43, Ls.13-15.) A detective subsequently entered
the room with Massey's consent, collected the baggie, which tested positive for
methamphetamine, and "other items of paraphernalia and contraband."
p.70, L.10 - p.71, L.18.)

(Tr.,

A search of Pfeiffer, who also had an outstanding

warrant for his arrest, uncovered $895.00 in cash. (Tr., p.71, L.19 - p.72, L.8.)
The state charged Pfeiffer with trafficking in methamphetamine or
amphetamine. (R., pp.6-7, 39-40.) Pfeiffer filed a motion to suppress contending
the officers "illegally entered the hotel room" and did not advise him of his
Miranda rights prior to "interrogat[ingJ" him.

(R., pp.57-58.)

The district court

denied Pfeiffer's motion concluding, under the totality of the circumstances, the
"police officers' actions in this case were reasonable and constitutional." 1 (R.,
p.96; Tr. pp.98-120.) Pfeiffer subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to
the charged offense and the court imposed a unified 12-year sentence with three
years fixed.

(R., pp.111-12.)

Pfeiffer filed a Rule 35 motion, which the court

denied. (R., pp.125-26.) Pfeiffer timely appealed. (R., pp.115-17.)

1

The district court did not rule on the Miranda component of Pfeiffer's
suppression motion because Pfeiffer did not identify what statements he wanted
suppressed and no evidence was presented on that issue. (Tr., p.120, Ls.8-20.)
3

ISSUES
Pfeiffer states the issue on appeal as:
A.
Did the District Court err by denying the Appellant's Motion
to Suppress Evidence?

B.
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Pfeiffer's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) Motion For A Reduction
Of Sentence?
(Appellant's Brief, p.3 (capitalization original).)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
1.
Has Pfeiffer failed to show error in the district court's denial of his
motion to suppress?
2.
Has Pfeiffer failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the denial
of his Rule 35 motion?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Pfeiffer Has Failed To Demonstrate The District Court Erred In Denying His
Motion To Suppress Evidence
A.

Introduction
Pfeiffer asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress,

contending

"[n]o

basis

for the

community caretaking

function

existed."

(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Pfeiffer's claim fails. Application of the law to the facts
shows the district court correctly concluded that law enforcement's actions in this
case were constitutionally reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.

State v.

Klingler, 143 Idaho 494,496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).

C.

Pfeiffer Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The Denial Of His
Suppression Motion
Pfeiffer asserts the district court erred in denying his suppression motion

because, he argues, "the officer conceded she had no evidence that Mr. Pfeiffer
was in need of assistance" and there was no "information . . . available to
suggest a need to exercise her community caretaking function" "other than the
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fact [the officer] knocked on the door." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Pfeiffer's claim is
contradicted by the record and is contrary to the district court's factual findings.
'[B]ecause the

ultimate touchstone

of the

Fourth

Amendment

is

'reasonableness,' the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions."
Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citations omitted). Thus,
for example, a warrant is not required where "the exigencies of the situation
make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
quotations omitted).

Id. (citations and

"The reasonableness standard imposed by the Fourth

Amendment requires that the nature of the intrusion upon the individual's privacy
interest be balanced against the public need and governmental interest promoted
by the action taken."

State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293, 62 P.3d 214, 217

(2003) (citations omitted). Reasonableness is assessed based on the totality of
the circumstances.

!fl

Courts have repeatedly recognized that members of law

enforcement do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they take action
consistent with their community caretaking function.

!fl

The community caretaking function involves the duty of the police to help
individuals that officers believe are in need of immediate assistance.

State v.

Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 754, 947 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1997) (citing In re Clayton,
113 Idaho 817, 748 P.2d 401(1988)).

"In analyzing community caretaking

function cases, Idaho courts have adopted a totality of the circumstances test."
Id.

"The constitutional standard in community caretaking function cases is

whether intrusive action of police was reasonable in view of all surrounding

6

circumstances." Wixom, 130 Idaho at 754, 947 P.2d at 1002 (quoting State v.
Waldie, 126 Idaho 864, 867, 893 P.2d 811, 814 (Ct. App. 1995)) (brackets
omitted).

The emergency aid doctrine is encompassed within the community

caretaking function. Barrett, 138 Idaho at 295, 62 P.3d at 219 (noting that Idaho
"treats the emergency aid doctrine within the community care-taking function
exception").

The emergency aid doctrine allows law enforcement to make a

warrantless entry into a place protected by the Fourth Amendment when there is
a "need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such
injury."

Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (citations omitted).

"An action is

'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's
state of mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the
action."

kl

at 404 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978)

(emphasis original, brackets omitted).

"The officer's subjective motive is

irrelevant." Brigham City at 404 (citation omitted).
A review of the totality of the circumstances in this case supports the
district court's conclusion that the officers' conduct was reasonable.

Massey,

who was acting paranoid and behaving irrationally, expressed a belief that
people, including an individual in his motel room who turned out to be Pfeiffer,
were intent on harming him. Massey indicated he would respond to any such
threat by shooting the person or running him over with his car. It was objectively
reasonable for the officers to conclude, based on Massey's threats and the
information that there was someone in Massey's motel room that Massey
included among those "out to get him," that the person in the motel room was in
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need of assistance either because he was "seriously injured" or, if nothing else,
to warn him of the threat Massey presented. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406 ("The
role of a peace officer includes preventing violence and restoring order, not
simply rendering first aid to casualties; an officer is not like a boxing (or hockey)
referee, poised to stop a bout only if it becomes too one-sided."). The officers'
concern for Pfeiffer's safety was only enhanced when he would not respond
when they pounded on the door.

For all the officers knew, Pfeiffer may have

already been seriously or fatally wounded. "[H]indsight determination that there
was in fact no emergency" does not establish the officers' actions were
objectively unreasonable.

Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S.Ct. 546, 549 (2009) (per

curiam).
Also relevant to the reasonableness inquiry is the manner of the officers'
entry in this case.

Brigham City is instructive on this point.

In Brigham City,

officers entered a home after seeing a "melee" inside that involved "four adults
[who] were attempting, with some difficulty to restrain a juvenile." 547 U.S. at
401.

"The juvenile eventually broke free, swung a fist and struck one of the

adults in the face," drawing blood.

&

(quotations omitted).

"The other adults

continued to try to restrain the juvenile, pressing him against a refrigerator with
such force that the refrigerator began moving across the floor."

&

It was only

then that an officer "opened the screen door and announced the o·fficers'
presence."

&

The Court concluded the officers behaved reasonably in entering

the residence, noting that the officer "opened the screen door and yelled in
police" and only entered, to announce the officers' presence "[w]hen nobody
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heard him." Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406. The Court reasoned that the officer's
conduct "was probably the only option that had even a chance of rising above the
din," and was constitutionally reasonable under the circumstances.

kl at 406-07.

The Court further noted "it would serve no purpose to require them to stand
dumbly at the door awaiting a response while those within brawled on, oblivious
to their presence."
Pfeiffer argues, "No observations were made other than the fact [the
officer] knocked on the door, and no other information was available to suggest a
need to exercise [the] community caretaking function."

(Appellant's Brief, p.5.)

This argument ignores the totality of the circumstances test applicable to the
Fourth Amendment inquiry.

The need to exercise the community caretaking

arose as a result of the perceived threat Massey represented coupled with
Pfeiffer's unresponsiveness when the officers attempted to ascertain his wellbeing. The officers' actions in response to the information available to them was
objectively reasonable. Pfeiffer's reliance on State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301, 47
P.3d 1271 (Ct. App. 2002), in support of a contrary conclusion is unpersuasive.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.4-5.)
In Schmidt, a deputy on patrol noticed a vehicle "parked twenty to thirty
feet off on the right side of the road in an unimproved pullout." 137 Idaho at 302,
47 P.3d at 1272. "Believing that the vehicle had perhaps run off the road or had
an accident, [the deputy] stopped to investigate," parking "directly in front of the
other vehicle," blocking it.
~

~

The deputy's overhead lights were also activated.

As the deputy approached the vehicle, he noticed the driver "trying to hide
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something either underneath the dashboard or between her legs."

kl

The

deputy approached the vehicle to ask if everything was okay and, when the
driver rolled down the window, the deputy "detected an odor of what he believed
to be marijuana coming from the vehicle."

kl

Upon further investigation and

discovery of marijuana, the deputy arrested Schmidt, who was a passenger in
the vehicle, for possession of marijuana.

kl

Schmidt argued her "initial detention was constitutionally unreasonable."
Schmidt, 137 Idaho at 303, 47 P.3d at 1273.

The Court of Appeals agreed,

rejecting the state's assertion that the officer's actions were appropriate under
the community caretaking function.

kl at 303-04, 47

P.3d at 1273-74. The Court

reasoned that the deputy's "belief that the occupants of the car were in need of
immediate assistance" was "not reasonable in view of all the surrounding
circumstances."

kl at 304, 47 P.3d at 1274.

Specifically, the Court noted:

[The deputy] did not receive any notice from dispatch that there
were any emergencies involving vehicles in the area nor did he
have any reports from any other source that this particular vehicle
was stranded or abandoned. There was no debris or skid marks on
the roadway, and the roadway was not slick with ice, snow or rain
so as to create the possibility of a slide-off.
The exterior
appearance of the vehicle did not indicate that it had been involved
in an accident. There was no visual evidence that the vehicle left
the road in a reckless or inattentive manner. Further, the vehicle
was parked in a lawful and safe manner at least twenty feet from
the roadway in an area described by [the deputy] as a "pull out." It
is undisputed that it was off the roadway and not a safety hazard.
Moreover, [the deputy] did not observe anything about the vehicle's
occupants that led him to believe they were in need of assistance.
The only information that [the deputy] possessed was that the
vehicle was parked with its lights off, facing oncoming traffic in a
place he had never seen a car parked before.
Schmidt, 137 Idaho at 304, 47 P.3d at 1274.
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Pfeiffer's reliance on Schmidt is predicated on the erroneous comparison
that "[a]s in [that] case, here the officer conceded she had no evidence that Mr.
Pfeiffer was in need of assistance."

(Appellant's Brief, p.5.)

It appears this

assertion is based on testimony from the preliminary hearing. (See Appellant's
Brief, p.2.) As an initial matter, the state notes that although the court indicated it
had read "major portions" of the preliminary hearing transcript (Tr., p.7, Ls.2021), and defense counsel used the prosecutor's copy of the transcript at one
point during the suppression hearing to cross-examine a witness (Tr., p.74, L.14
- p.78, L.8), that transcript was not admitted as an exhibit at the suppression
hearing (see generally Tr.). Pfeiffer's reliance on that transcript in support of his
claim is, therefore, improper.

Regardless, Officer Parker's acknowledgement

that law enforcement "didn't receive any calls that somebody was hurt inside the
hotel room" (Tr., p.78, Ls.11-14 (emphasis added)), does not diminish the
information law enforcement obtained once they were on scene, which warranted
their entry into Massey's motel room.
This case is factually analogous to Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 62 P.3d 214.
In Barrett, law enforcement responded to a report of a man who was collapsed
on his front porch and unresponsive.

1J:L

at 292, 62 P.3d at 216. A neighbor

advised the officer that Barrett lived with his wife and two children but that he had
not seen them that day.

1J:L

Because Barrett did not respond to questions about

whether there was anyone else in the house, the officers on scene "proceeded to
Barrett's house and identified themselves loudly several times, asking any
persons inside to come to the front door."
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1J:L

"[G]etting no response and hearing

nothing from inside," and concerned that Barrett's wife and children could be
inside and in need of medical assistance, the officers entered the residence.

kl

Once inside, the officers did not find any other occupants, but they did find
paraphernalia and heroin in plain view.

kl

On appeal, Barrett challenged the denial of his suppression motion.
Barrett, 138 Idaho at 293, 62 P.3d at 217.

The Court of Appeals upheld the

district court's order denying Barrett's motion, concluding:
Under the totality of the facts and circumstances as known to
the police at the time that they entered Barrett's house, and
reasonable inferences drawn thereupon, we conclude that there
existed a compelling need for the police to enter. The state has
satisfied its burden to show that the risk of danger to persons inside
the dwelling, as then reasonably perceived by police, constituted an
exigency justifying that warrantless entry. Here, the state's claim of
exigency is not a mere pretext for an unlawful entry and search, but
the police officers legitimately believed, particularly in view of their
inability to discern the cause of the medical condition affecting
Barrett, that the life of any occupants of Barrett's house may very
well have been at stake. Because the police officers were still in
the process of searching downstairs for persons in need of
assistance, the exigent circumstances had not ceased to exist
when Hosford observed the drug evidence in plain view in the
kitchen.
Barrett, 138 Idaho at 294-95, 62 P.3d at 218-19.
As in Barrett, there was a "compelling need for the police to enter"
Massey's hotel room.

Based on Massey's statements, the officers had a

legitimate basis for concern that the individual in Massey's motel room could be
in need of assistance.

Because the police officers were in the process of

ascertaining Pfeiffer's well-being when they saw the methamphetamine in plain
view on the bed next to Pfeiffer, there was no Fourth Amendment violation
requiring suppression. Pfeiffer has failed to establish otherwise.
12

Pfeiffer has failed to demonstrate law enforcement acted unreasonably in
violation of the Fourth Amendment by entering the motel room to ensure the
safety of whoever was inside that room.

Pfeiffer has therefore failed to

demonstrate error in the district court's denial of his motion to suppress.

II.
Pfeiffer Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Denying His Rule 35 Motion
A.

Introduction
The district court imposed a unified 12-year sentence with three years

fixed following Pfeiffer's conditional guilty plea to trafficking in methamphetamine
or amphetamine.

(R., pp.111-12.)

Pfeiffer filed a Rule 35 motion, which the

court denied. (R., pp.125-26.) Pfeiffer argues the district court erred in denying
his motion "because the sentence was excessive as originally imposed.''
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)

B.

Standard Of Review
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v.

Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland,
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)).

C.

Pfeiffer Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Rule 35 Motion
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of

sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this Court reviews the denial
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203,
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). Pfeiffer acknowledges he failed to provide any "new
13

information or documentation in support of his Rule 35 motion," thus, his only
contention is that the district court erred in denying the motion because, he
argues, his sentence "was excessive as originally imposed" in light of his age and
his lack of any prior felonies. 2 (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) The record supports the
sentence imposed.
A court's decision not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion subject to the well-established standards governing whether a
sentence is excessive. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct.
App. 2009). Those standards require an appellant to "establish that, under any
reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive considering the
objectives of criminal punishment."
P.3d 969, 975 (2005).

State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104

Those objectives are: "(1) protection of society; (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe,
99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978).

Although the appellate court

considers the entire length of the sentence, it is presumed the fixed portion of the
sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Justice,
152 Idaho 48, ---, 266 P.3d 1153, 1159 (Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted) ..
In imposing sentence, the district court expressly considered the
objectives of sentencing but was constrained by the mandatory minimum three-

2

Because Pfeiffer's notice of appeal is timely from the judgment of conviction,
and because his Rule 35 motion fails to provide any new or additional
information, the motion is ultimately irrelevant to the Court's sentencing review.
Nevertheless, because Pfeiffer has framed the issue as error in the denial of his
Rule 35 motion, the state has done so as well.
14

year sentence required by the legislature for trafficking in methamphetamine and
concluded that the 12-year sentence with three years fixed was necessary to
achieve the objectives of sentencing. (Tr., p.190, L.1 - p.191, L.25.) The district
court also specifically considered Pfeiffer's age but noted that "chronologically,
[Pfeiffer hasJ had opportunities to mature" but he has "chosen not to take
advantage of [those] because of [his] drug use."

(Tr., p.188, Ls.18-20.) The

court also acknowledged Pfeiffer's lack of a felony record, but, at that same time,
noted Pfeiffer had "three active warrants for his arrest when he moved here in
2009." (Tr., p.190, Ls.8-12.) Further, while Pfeiffer had not yet accumulated a
felony record by age 22, he had several misdemeanor convictions including
convictions for obstructing law enforcement,

making false or misleading

statements, assault, minor in possession, possession of marijuana, reckless
driving (amended from driving under the influence), and petit theft (PSI, pp.4-

In denying Pfeiffer's Rule 35 motion, the court correctly concluded the
"sentence imposed was rational, thoughtful and appropriate based on the facts
and the law." (R., p.126.) Pfeiffer has failed to establish otherwise.

3

Citations to the PSI are to documents contained in the electronic file designated
PfeifferPS I. pdf.
15

CONCLUSION
Pfeiffer has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress or in denying his Rule 35 motion. The state requests that this
Court affirm.
DATED this 6th day of July, 2012.

JESSlp7A M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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